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Let F be some block cipher (eg., DES) with block length l. The cipher
block chaining message authentication code (CBC MAC) specifies that an
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secret key a for the block cipher by tagging x with a prefix of ym , where
y0=0l and y i=Fa(mi  yi&1) for i=1, 2, ..., m. This method is a pervasively
used international and U.S. standard. We provide its first formal justification,
showing the following general lemma: cipher block chaining a pseudorandom
function yields a pseudorandom function. Underlying our results is a techni-
cal lemma of independent interest, bounding the success probability of a
computationally unbounded adversary in distinguishing between a random
ml-bit to l-bit function and the CBC MAC of a random l-bit to l-bit
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Problem: Is the CBC MAC Secure?
Message authentication lets communicating partners who share a secret key
verify that a received message originates with the party who claims to have sent it.
This is one of the most important and widely used cryptographic tools. It is most
often achieved using a message authentication code, or MAC. This is a short string
MACa(x) computed on the message x to be authenticated and the shared secret key
a. The sender transmits (x, MACa(x)) and the receiver, who gets (x$, _$), verifies
that _$=MACa(x$).
The most common MAC is built using the idea of cipher block chaining (CBC)
some underlying block cipher. To discuss this approach we first need some nota-
tion. Given a function f : [0, 1]l  [0, 1] l and a number m1 we denote by
f (m): [0, 1]ml  [0, 1] l the function that maps an ml-bit input x=x1 } } } xm (where
|xi |=l ) to the l-bit string ym computed as follows: set y0=0l and then iterate
yi  f ( yi&1 xi) for i=1, ..., m. We call f (m) the (m-fold) cipher block chaining of
f. A block cipher F with key-length k and block-length l specifies a family of per-
mutations Fa : [0, 1] l  [0, 1] l, one for each k-bit key a. The CBC MAC con-
structed from F has an associated parameter sl which is the number of bits it
outputs. The CBC MAC is then defined for any ml-bit string x=x1 } } } xm by
CBCm-Fa(x1 } } } xm)[s] =
def
The first s bits of F (m)a (x1 } } } xm).
The CBC MAC is an international standard [13]. The most popular and widely
used special case uses F=DES (the data encryption standard; here k=56 and
l=64) and s=32, in which case we recover the definition of the corresponding U.S.
standard [2]. These standards are extensively employed in the banking sector and
in other commercial sectors. Given this degree of usage and standardization, one
might expect that there would be a large body of work aimed at learning if the CBC
MAC is secure. Yet this has not been the case. In fact, prior to the current results
it was seen as entirely possible that CBCm-F might be a completely insecure MAC
even when F is realized by a highly secure block cipher. There was no reason to
believe that the internal structure of F could not ‘‘interact badly’’ with the specifics
of cipher block chaining.
1.2. Our Approach
In this paper we will show that CBC MAC construction is secure if the underly-
ing block cipher is secure. To make this statement meaningful we need first to
discuss what we mean by security in each case.
What does it mean to assume a block cipher is secure? To describe the security
of a block cipher we elaborate on a viewpoint suggested by Luby and Rackoff [15,
16] with regard to DES. They suggest that a good block cipher can be assumed to
behave as a good pseudorandom function (PRF). The formal notion of a PRF is
due to Goldreich et al. [10]. Roughly said, the security of a family of functions F
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as a PRF is measured by an adversary’s inability to distinguish the following two
types of objects, based on their inputoutput behavior: a black-box for Fa( } ) on a
random key a and a black box for a truly random function f ( } ).
A somewhat ‘‘tighter’’ model for a block cipher is to say that it should behave as
a good pseudorandom permutation (PRP). The security of F as a PRP is measured
by an adversary’s inability to distinguish the following two types of objects: a black-
box for Fa( } ) on a random key a and a black box for a random permutation ?( } ).
What does it mean for a MAC to be secure? Our notion of security for a
message authentication code adopts the viewpoint of Goldwasser et al. [12] with
regard to signature schemes; namely, a secure MAC must resist existential forgery
under an adaptive chosen-message attack. An adversary is allowed to obtain valid
MACs of some number of messages of its choice and wins if it can then output a
‘‘new’’ message (meaning one whose MAC it did not obtain during the chosen-
message attack phase) together with a valid MAC of this message.
Concrete security. We wish to obtain results that are meaningful for practice. In
particular, we aim to say something about the correct and incorrect use of block
ciphers like DES. Such functions have finite domains; there is no asymptotics
present. Thus we are led to avoid asymptotics and to specify security bounds quite
concretely. We strive for reductions that are as security-preserving as possible, and
we measure the degree of demonstrated security by way of explicit formulasthe
resource-translation functions.
We will only talk about finite families of functions and the resources needed to
learn things about them. To any such family we associate an insecurity function that
takes as input resource bounds for the adversary and returns a real number, this
number being the maximum possible probability that an adversary could break the
security of the family when restricted to the given resources. The meaning of
‘‘break’’ differs according to the security goal being considered: it might be in terms
of pseudorandomness or as a MAC. The resources of interest are the running time
t of the adversary and the number of queries q that he or she makes to an oracle
that is his or her only point of access to f ( } )-values for the given instance f of family
F. We emphasize the importance of keeping t and q separate: in practice, oracle
queries (q) correspond to observations or interactions with a system whose overall
structure often severely limits the reasonable values; but time (t) corresponds to off-
line computation by the adversary and cannot, therefore, be architecturally con-
trolled. A proof of security for CBCm-F is obtained by upper bounding the
insecurity of CBCm-F in terms of the insecurity of F itself. Let us look at some
results to see how it works.
1.3. Results
Our main result is stated formally as Theorem 3.2. Informally, it says that the
CBC MAC transform is PRF-preserving. Namely, the CBC MAC of a pseudoran-
dom function (or permutation) F is itself a pseudorandom function. The security of
the CBC MAC as a MAC follows because it is a well-known observation that any
PRF is a secure message authentication code [10, 11]see Section 2.4 for details.
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Statement. To illustrate the main result, let F be the given block cipher with
block-length l. The concrete security statement of one version of our theorem is the
following: for any integers q, t, m1,
AdvprfCBCm-F (q, t)Adv
prp
F (q$, t$)+
q2m2
2l&1
, (1)
where q$=mq and t$=t+O(mql ).
Explanation of terms. Here AdvprfCBC m-F (q, t) is the maximum, over all adversaries
restricted to q inputoutput examples and execution time t, of the advantage that
the adversary has (compared to simply guessing) in the game of distinguishing a
random instance of family CBCm-F from a random function of ml bits to l bits.
Similarly, AdvprpF (q, t) is the maximum, over all adversaries restricted to q$
inputoutput examples and execution time t$, of the advantage that the adversary
has in the game of distinguishing a random instance of family F from a random per-
mutation on l bits. Precise definitions of these quantities can be found in Section 2,
but for the moment, it will suffice to remember that for these functions a small
value corresponds to a lower breaking probability, and hence to greater security.
Qualitative interpretation. Roughly, Eq. (1) says that the chance of breaking the
CBC MAC of F using some given amount of resources is not much more than the
chance of breaking F itself with comparable resources. That is, if F is a secure PRP
then CBCm-F is a secure PRF. This qualitative statement already conveys informa-
tion of a nature not found in previous approaches to the analysis of the CBC MAC,
because it demonstrates that if the underlying primitive is secure, then so is the
MAC based on it. Thus there is no need to directly cryptanalyze the CBC MAC;
cryptanalytic effort can remain concentrated on the lower level primitive F. This is
the benefit of the reductionist paradigm.
Quantitative interpretation. Practical information can be garnered by taking into
account the quantitative aspects of the result. First note that no matter how secure
the given block cipher F, our upper bound bound on the insecurity of CBCm-F
grows proportionally to the square of the number of queries times the square of the
number of blocks in each message. If the security really drops off in such a manner,
it is due to an inherent weakness in the CBC MAC construction itself and has
nothing to do with the block cipher being used.
To assess the demonstrated security of the CBC MAC using a given block cipher
F we would use current cryptanalytic knowledge to estimate the value of
=$=AdvprpF (q$, t$) for given q$, t$. Here =$ represents a probability of adversarial suc-
cess that we can (for now) rule out. These values would of necessity be conjectural.
With such a value for =$ in hand, we can compute the value of the right-hand side
of Eq. (1) and thereby get a specific upper bound on the probability of adversarial
success in breaking the CBC MAC. Numerical examples will be given later in the
paper.
Reductionist interpretation. The result can be interpreted in terms of adversary
transformations as follows. Suppose there is an adversary A that breaks CBCm-F
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with some probability = while using resources q and t. Then A can be turned into
an adversary A$ of comparable time complexity t$ that, making q$=qm oracle
queries, achieves advantage =$==&q2m2 } 2&l+1 in breaking F itself.
Information theoretic case. The brunt of the proof addresses the information-
theoretic case of the above result. Here we consider the problem of distinguishing
a random ml-bit to l-bit function from the m-fold CBC of a random l-bit to l-bit
function. In Theorem 3.1 we prove an absolute bound of 3q2m2 } 2&l&1 on the
advantage an adversary can derive. The bound holds irrespective of the adversary’s
running time.
Security as a MAC. Theorem 4.1 completes the picture by upper bounding the
MAC insecurity of CBCm-F in terms of the PRP insecurity of F. This is done by
combining the above result with Proposition 2.7, which shows that the standard
PRF to MAC reduction has tight security. We also consider the tightness of our
analysis.
1.4. Extensions and Applications
Pseudorandom functions are basic tools in cryptography. In addition to shedding
light on the security of the CBC MAC, our work provides a method of building
secure PRFs that can be used in a wide range of applications, in the following way.
Cryptographic practice directly provides PRFs (more accurately, PRPs) on fixed
input lengths, in the form of block ciphers. On the other hand, PRFs are very useful
in applications, but one typically needs PRFs on long strings. The CBC theorem
provides a provably good way of extending the basic PRFs, which work on short
inputs, to PRFs that work on longer inputs. It was based on such constructions
that PRFs were suggested by [7] as the tool of choice for practical applications
such as entity authentication and key distribution.
The CBC MAC of an l-bit block cipher provides an efficient way to produce a
PRF to l-bits or fewer when the input is of fixed length ml. But often the input
lengths may vary. We describe in Section 5 some simple mechanisms to extend the
CBC MAC to authenticate words of arbitrary length. We also demonstrate that some
plausible-looking mechanisms do not work, such as MACa(x)=F (m+1)a (x & m).
1.5. History and Related Work
The lack of any theorem linking the security of F to that of F (m) led previous
users of the CBC MAC to view F (m), and not F, as the basic primitive. For
example, when Bird et al. [8] required a practical message authentication code in
order to achieve their higher-level goal of entity authentication, they made
appropriate assumptions about the CBC MAC.
A cryptanalytic approach directly attacks the CBC MAC based on details of the
underlying block cipher F. An attempt to directly attack the DES CBC MAC using
differential cryptanalysis is described in [17].
Another approach to studying MACs is rooted in the examination of protocols
that use them. Stubblebine and Gligor [20] find flaws in the use of the CBC MAC
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in some well-known protocols. But as the authors make clear, the CBC MAC is not
itself at fault for the indicated protocol failures; rather, it is the manner in which
the containing protocols incorrectly embed the CBC MAC. The authors go on to
correct some protocols by having them properly use the CBC MAC.
The concrete security approach makes more explicit and emphatic some features
already present in the asymptotic approach typically used in theoretical works.
With asymptotic analysis security guarantees often take the form of the success
probability of a polynomially bounded adversary being negligible (everything
measured as a function of the security parameter). The concrete security can usually
be derived by examining the proof. However, a lack of focus on getting good con-
crete security bounds has often led to reductions that are so inefficient that the
results are of no obvious use to cryptographic practice.
1.6. Subsequent Work
Since the appearance of the preliminary version of this work [4] there has been
further related research.
The current paper provides an upper bound on the insecurity of the CBC MAC
and our analysis highlights the role of collisions. Preneel and van Oorschot [19]
give a corresponding attack, also exploiting collisions. Some gap remains between
our result and theirs; closing it is an interesting problem. See Section 4 for more
information. Another attack is given in [14].
Several CBC MAC variations have been suggested to get around the problem
mentioned above that the CBC MAC is only secure when strings are of some one
fixed length. One nice suggestion is to compute the (basic) CBC MAC using a first
key, and then encipher that result using a second (independent) key. Petrank and
Rackoff analyze this construction [18].
One might ask whether the security of CBCm-F as a MAC could be shown to
follow from a weaker assumption on F than that it is a PRF. Work of An and
Bellare [1] shows that it is not enough to assume that F is a MAC; they give an
example of a secure MAC F for which CBCm-F is not a secure MAC.
Cipher block chaining is not the only method of constructing a MAC. Amongst
the many proposed methods we mention XOR-MACs [6], HMAC [5], and
UMAC [9]. Some of these alternative constructions improve on the CBC MAC in
terms of speed or security bounds.
1.7. Discussion and Open Questions
Block ciphers like DES are in fact permutations. One open question is whether
the permutativity of the block cipher could be exploited to prove a stronger reduc-
tion than that in our main theorem. The fact that one typically outputs a number
of bits s<l seems relevant and useful in strengthening the bounds that would
otherwise be achieved.
This paper brings out the importance of modeling the fixed input and output
lengths common to the primitives of contemporary cryptographic practice. When a
family of functions, each from l bits to L bits (for some particular and fixed values
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of l and L), aims to mimic a family of random functions from l bits to L bits, we
refer to this family as a finite PRF. Finite PRFs, and the concrete security analysis
of constructions based on them, are a technique for investigating the efficacy of
many classical (and not-so-classical) cryptographic constructions. In this way one
can formally treat security constructs such as CBC encryption, finding for each such
construction upper and lower bounds on its security [3].
2. DEFINITIONS AND BASIC FACTS
The primitives we discuss in this paper include message authentication codes,
pseudorandom functions, and pseudorandom permutations. An important aspect of
our approach is to use a concrete (sometimes also called exact) security framework,
meaning there are no asymptotics. This is necessary because we want to model
block ciphers and their usages, and a block cipher is a finite object. In this section,
we present definitions that enable a concrete security treatment. We also note basic
facts or relations that we will exploit later.
2.1. Families of functions
All the above-mentioned objects are families of functions having security proper-
ties which differ from case to case. The starting point is thus to define (finite)
families of functions. Security properties will be considered later.
A family of functions is a map F: Keys(F )_Dom(F )  Ran(F ). Here Keys(F ) is
the key space of F; Dom(F ) is the domain of F; and Ran(F ) is the range of F. The
two-input function F takes a key a # Keys(F ) and an input x # Dom(F ) to return a
point F(a, x) # Ran(F ). If Keys(F )=[0, 1]k for an integer k then we refer to k as
the key-length. If Dom(F )=[0, 1]d for some integer d then we refer to d as the
input-length. If Ran(F )=[0, 1]L for some integer L then we refer to L as the out-
put-length. In this paper, Keys(F ), Dom(F ), and Ran(F ) will always be finite.
For each key a # Keys(F ) we define the map Fa : Dom(F )  Ran(F ) by
Fa(x)=F(a, x) for all x # Dom(F ). Thus, F specifies a collection of maps from
Dom(F ) to Ran(F ), each map being associated with a key. That is why F is called
a family of functions. We refer to Fa as an instance of F.
We often speak of choosing a random key a uniformly from Keys(F). This opera-
tion is written a R Keys(F ). We write f R F for the operation a R Keys(F ); f  Fa .
That is, f R F denotes the operation of selecting at random a function from the
family F. When f is so selected it is called a random instance of F.
We say that F is a family of permutations if Dom(F )=Ran(F ), and for each key
a # Keys(F ) it is the case that Fa is a permutation (i.e., a bijection) on Dom(F ).
Example. Any block cipher is a family of permutations. For example, DES is a
family of permutations with Keys(DES)=[0, 1]56 and Dom(DES)=Ran(DES)=
[0, 1]64. This family has key-length 56, input-length 64, and output-length 64.
Random functions and permutations. In order to define PRFs and PRPs we first
need to fix two function families. One is Randl  L, the family of all functions from
[0, 1]l to [0, 1]L, and the other is Perm l, the family of all permutations on [0, 1] l.
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Before defining these objects formally, let us describe the intuition about their
behavior that is important here. Consider an algorithm, A, that has an oracle for
a random instance f of Randl  L and makes some number of distinct queries to this
oracle. Then every invocation of the oracle yields an output that is random and dis-
tributed independent of all previous outputs. If f is a random instance of Perml,
then every invocation of the oracle yields an output distributed uniformly amongst
all range points not already obtained as outputs of the oracle via previous queries.
Let us now specify these families formally. For this purpose it is convenient to fix
some bijection ordl : [0, 1] l  [1, 2, ..., 2l], given, for example, by a canonical
ordering of the elements of [0, 1] l. Now Randl  L: [0, 1]k_[0, 1] l  [0, 1]L is a
family with key-space [0, 1]k where k=L2l, and we interpret a key a=a[1] } } }
a[2l] in the key space as a sequence of L-bit strings that specifies the value of the
associated function at each point in the input domain, meaning Randl  L(a, x)=
a[ordl (x)]. The operation f 
R
Randl  L simply selects a random function of l-bits
to L-bits. On the other hand Perm l: Keys(Perml)_[0, 1] l  [0, 1] l has a key space
given by
Keys(Perm l)=[(a[1], ..., a[2l]) : a[1], ..., a[2l] # [0, 1] l are all distinct],
and for any key a=(a[1], ..., a[2l]) in Keys(Perm l) and any x # [0, 1] l we define
Perml (a, x)=a[ordl (x)]. The operation f 
R
Perml selects a random permutation
on [0, 1] l.
2.2. Model of Computation
We fix some particular random access machine (RAM) as a model of computa-
tion. An adversary is a program for this RAM. An adversary may have access to
an oracle. Its query-complexity, or the number of queries it makes, is the number
of times it consults this oracle. Oracle queries are understood to be be answered in
unit time unless otherwise indicated. When we speak of A’s running time this will
include A’s actual execution time plus the length of A’s description (meaning the
length of the RAM program that describes A). This convention eliminates
pathologies caused if one can embed arbitrarily large lookup tables in A’s descrip-
tion.
(Alternatively, the reader can think in terms of circuits over some fixed basis of
gates, like 2-input NAND gates. An adversary is such a circuit, and now time
simply means the circuit size. Circuits are allowed special query gates for making
oracle queries. This formulation is simpler to specify in full detail, but it is rather
less intuitive.)
2.3. Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations
Distinguishers. The notion of a distinguisher is due to [10]. Let F 0: Keys(F 0)_
D  R and F 1: Keys(F 1)_D  R be two function families with a common domain
D and a common range R. A distinguisher for F 0 versus F 1 is an adversary A that
has access to an oracle f : D  R and, at the end of its computation, outputs a bit.
The oracle will be chosen either as a random instance of F 0 or as a random
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instance of F 1, and the distinguisher is trying to tell these cases apart. The closer
the two families, the harder the task of the distinguisher, so that distinguishing
ability provides a measure of distance between function families.
PRFs. The pseudorandomness of a function family F : Keys(F )_[0, 1] l 
[0, 1]L is its distance from the family of all functions. Namely, pseudorandomness
measures the ability of a distinguisher to tell whether its given oracle is a random
instance of F or a random function of [0, 1] l to [0, 1]L.
Definition 2.1. Suppose F : Keys(F )_[0, 1]l  [0, 1]L is some function
family. Then for any distinguisher A we let
AdvprfF (A)=Pr[ f 
R F : A f=1]&Pr[ f R Randl  L : A f=1].
We associate to F an insecurity function AdvprfF ( } , } ) defined for any integers q, t0
via
AdvprfF (q, t)=max
A
[AdvprfF (A)].
The maximum is over all distinguishers A that make at most q oracle queries and
have running-time at most t.
The quantity ‘‘running-time’’ needs to be properly defined, and in doing so we
adopt some important conventions. First, we define the execution-time of A as the
time taken for the execution of the experiment f R F; b  A f. Note that we are con-
sidering the time for all steps in the experiment, including the time taken to com-
pute replies to oracle queries made by A, and even the time to select a random
member of f (meaning the time to select a key at random from Keys(F )). The
running-time of A is defined as the execution time plus the size of the description
of A in our fixed RAM model of computation discussed above.
With F fixed we view AdvprfF ( } , } ) as a function of q and t. This is the insecurity
function of F as a PRF, and it fully captures the behavior of F as a PRF. It returns
the maximum possible advantage that a distinguisher can obtain in telling apart
random instances of F from random functions when the distinguisher is restricted
to q oracle queries and time t. For any particular values of q, t, the lower this quan-
tity, the better the quality of F as a PRF at the given resource constraints.
Note that under this concrete security paradigm there is no fixed or formal
notion of a secure pseudorandom function family. Every family F simply has some
associated insecurity as a PRF. We use the terminology ‘‘F is a PRF’’ only in infor-
mal discussions. It is meant to indicate that AdvprfF (q, t) is low for reasonable values
of q, t. Formal result statements will always refer directly to the insecurity function.
PRPs. Luby and Rackoff defined a pseudorandom permutation as a family of
permutations that is computationally indistinguishable from the family of random
functions [15]. Our notion is a little different. We measure distance from the family
of all permutations, not the family of all functions. Note the difference only
manifests itself when concrete security is considered. The motivation is that this
better models concrete primitives like block ciphers.
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Definition 2.2. Suppose F : Keys(F )_[0, 1]l  [0, 1]l is some function family.
Then for any distinguisher A we let
AdvprpF (A)=Pr[ f 
R F : A f=1]&Pr[ f R Perm l : A f=1].
We associate to F an insecurity function AdvprpF ( } , } ) defined for any integers
q, t0, via
AdvprpF (q, t)=max
A
[AdvprpF (A)].
The maximum is over all distinguishers A that make at most q oracle queries and
have running-time at most t.
The running-time is measured using the same conventions as used for PRFs.
Informally, we say that F is a PRP if it is a family of permutations for which
AdvprpF (q, t) is low for reasonable values of q, t.
Where is the key-length? There is one feature of the above parameterizations
about which everyone asks. Suppose F is a block cipher with key-length k, meaning
Keys(F )=[0, 1]k. Obviously, the key-length is an important aspect of a block
cipher’s security. Yet the key-length k does not even appear explicitly in the
insecurity function AdvprpF (q, t). Why is this? Because the key-length of F is already
reflected in AdvprpF (q, t) to the extent that it matters. The truth is that the key-length
itself is not what is of relevance; what matters is the advantage a distinguisher can
obtain.
General distance measures. Above we have considered measures of distance
between a given family F and two particular families, that of all functions and that
of all permutations. More generally one can measure the distance between two
families of functions.
Definition 2.3. Let F : Keys(F )_D  R and F $: Keys(F $)_D  R be two func-
tion families with a common domain D and a common range R, and let A be a
distinguisher. The advantage of A is defined as
AdvdistF, F $(A)=Pr[ f 
R F : A f=1]&Pr[ f R F $ : A f=1].
For any integer q we set
AdvdistF, F $(q)=max
A
[AdvdistF, F $(A)].
The maximum is over all distinguishers A that make at most q oracle queries.
The above is a statistical measure of distance in that it limits only the number
of oracle queries and not the running-time of the distinguisher. We could define the
corresponding computational measure by restricting time as well. We do not here,
for simplicity, because we will not use that notion in this paper except for the
special cases of PRFs and PRPs defined above.
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The birthday attack. A few simple facts with regard to the security of PRFs and
PRPs are worth noting as they are useful in applying our results and also in getting
a better understanding of concrete security. The following says that if E is a block
cipher with output-length l then there is an inherent limit to its quality as a PRF,
namely that security vanishes as the adversary asks about 2l2 queries. This is
regardless of the key-size of E and results only from the fact that E is a family of
permutations rather than functions. The reason is the birthday phenomenon. The
formal statement is the following.
Proposition 2.4. Let E: Keys(E)_[0, 1] l  [0, 1] l be any family of permuta-
tions, and let q be an integer with 1q2(l+1)2. Then there is a distinguisher A,
making q queries and using t=O(ql ) time, such that
AdvprfE (A)0.316 }
q(q&1)
2 l
.
As a consequence
AdvprfE (q, t)0.316 }
q(q&1)
2 l
.
Proof. The distinguisher D is given an oracle for a function g: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] l.
It mounts the following birthday attack:
Distinguisher D g
For i=1, ..., q do
Let xi be the i th l-bit string in lexicographic order
Let yi  g(xi)
End For
If y1 , ..., yq are all distinct then return 1, else return 0
To lower bound the advantage of A we claim that
Pr[ f R E : A f=1]=1 (2)
Pr[ f R Randl  l : A f=1]1&0.316 }
q(q&1)
2l
. (3)
Equation (2) is clear because if f is an instance of E then f is a permutation and
hence y1 , ..., yq are all distinct. Now suppose f is a random function of l-bits to
l-bits. Then the probability that y1 , ..., yq are all distinct is 1&C(2l, q) where
C(2l, q) is the chance of a collision in the experiment of throwing q balls randomly
and independently into 2l buckets. Now Eq. (3) follows from Proposition A.1. Sub-
tracting yields the claimed lower bound on the advantage. K
PRPs as PRFs. Analyses of constructions (including the CBC MAC) are often
easier assuming the underlying family is a PRF. However, a PRP better models a
block cipher. To bridge this gap we often do an analysis assuming the block cipher
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is a PRF and then use the following to relate the insecurity functions. The following
says, roughly, that the birthday attack is the best possible one. A particular family
of permutations E may have insecurity in the PRF sense that is greater than that
in the PRP sense, but only by an amount of q22l+1, the collision probability term
in the birthday attack.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose E: Keys(E)_[0, 1] l  [0, 1] l is a family of permuta-
tions. Then
AdvprfE (q, t)Adv
prp
E (q, t)+
q(q&1)
2l+1
.
Proof. Let A by any distinguisher for E versus Randl  l that makes q oracle
queries and runs for time at most t. We show that
AdvprfE (A)Adv
prp
E (A)+
q(q&1)
2l+1
. (4)
The proposition follows from the definitions of the insecurity functions.
Let A denote the distinguisher that first runs A to obtain an output bit b and
then returns b , the complement of b. Let Pr1[ } ] denote the probability that A f out-
puts 1 under the experiment f R Randl  l, and let Pr2[ } ] denote the probability
that A f outputs 1 under the experiment f R Perml. Then
AdvprfE (A)=Pr[ f 
R F : A f=1]&Pr1[A f=1]
=Pr1[A f=1]&Pr[ f 
R F : A f=1]
=Pr1[A f=1]&Pr2[A f=1]+Pr2[A f=1]&Pr[ f 
R F : A f=1]
=Pr1[A f=1]&Pr2[A f=1]+Pr[ f 
R F : A f=1]&Pr2[A f=1]
=Pr1[A f=1]&Pr2[A f=1]+AdvprpE (A).
So it suffices to show that
Pr1[A f=1]&Pr2[A f=1]
q(q&1)
2l+1
. (5)
Assume without loss of generality that all oracle queries of A (they are the same as
those of A ) are distinct. Let D denote the event that all the answers are distinct.
Then
Pr1[A f=1]=Pr1[A f=1 | D] } Pr1[D]+Pr1[A f=1 | cD] } Pr1[cD]
=Pr2[A f=1] } Pr1[D]+Pr1[A f=1 | cD] } Pr1[cD]
Pr2[A f=1]+Pr1[cD]
Pr2[A f=1]+
q(q&1)
2l+1
.
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In the last step we used Proposition A.1. This implies Eq. (5) and concludes the
proof. K
It is possible that AdvprpF (q, t) is considerably lower than Adv
prf
F (q, t) a block
cipher F. In particular if F has output-length l then AdvprfF (q, t) becomes substantial
by q=2l2 due to Proposition 2.4, yet it might be that AdvprpF (q, t) stays low even
for q far more than 2l2. Thus whenever possible we would prefer to bound the
insecurity of a block-cipher-based construction in terms of the insecurity of the
block cipher as PRP. In many cases, however (including in this paper), the con-
struction itself is subject to birthday attacks, so it makes little difference in the end.
2.4. Message Authentication Codes
A message authentication code is a family of functions MAC: Keys(MAC)_
Dom(MAC)  [0, 1]s. The domain is also called the message space; it is the set of
strings that can be authenticated using this function. The key a is shared between
the sender and the receiver, and when the sender wants to send a message M it
computes _=MAC(a, M) and transmits the pair (M, _) to the receiver. We typi-
cally refer to _ as the MAC of message M. The receiver recomputes MAC(a, M)
and verifies that this equals the value _ that accompanies M.
We define security by adapting and concretizing the notion of security for digital
signatures of [12]. An adversary, called a forger in this context, is allowed to
mount a chosen-message attack in which it can obtain MACS of messages of its
choice. It then outputs a pair (M, _) and is considered successful if this pair is a
valid forgery, meaning that _=MAC(a, M) and furthermore M is new in the sense
that it was not a message whose MAC the adversary obtained during the chosen-
message attack. Formally the success of an adversary A is measured by the
following experiment:
Experiment Forge(MAC, A)
a R Keys(MAC)
(M, _)  AMAC(a, } )
If MAC(a, M)=_ and M was not a query of A to its oracle
then return 1 else return 0
The chosen-message attack is captured by giving A an oracle for MAC(a, } ). It can
invoke this oracle on any message of its choice (with the restriction that this
message belongs to the domain Dom(MAC) of the message authentication code)
and thereby obtain the MAC of this message. The experiment returns 1 when A is
successful in forgery, and 0 otherwise. The output message M must also be in
Dom(MAC). In what follows we assume for simplicity that Dom(MAC)=[0, 1]d
for some integer d>0, since that is the case for the CBC MAC we consider here.
Definition 2.6. Let MAC: Keys(MAC)_[0, 1]d  [0, 1]s be a message authen-
tication code, and let A be a forger. The success probability of A is defined as
AdvmacMAC (A)=Pr[Experiment Forge(MAC, A) returns 1].
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We associate to MAC an insecurity function AdvmacMAC ( } , } ) defined for any integers
q, t0 via
AdvmacMAC (q, t)=max
A
[AdvmacMAC (A)].
The maximum is over all forgers A such that the oracle in Experiment
Forge(MAC, A) is invoked at most q times and the running time of A is at most t.
As above, the convention is that resource measures refer to the experiment
measuring adversarial success rather than to the adversary itself. In particular, q
bounds the total number of queries made in the experiment, meaning that in addi-
tion to queries made directly by the adversary, we include in the count the query
made to verify the forgery output by the adversary. The running time is the execu-
tion time of the experiment (including the time to choose the key and answer oracle
queries) plus the size of the description of the adversary.
The definition follows the same format as our previous ones in associating to
MAC an insecurity function measuring its quality as a message authentication code.
We have simplified by restricting the domain to strings of a fixed length because
that is the case for the basic CBC MAC we consider. When one wants to discuss
MACs over variable-length data, one should augment the set of resources to also
consider the total message length, defined as the sum of the lengths of all queries
made by the adversary plus the length of the message in the forgery output by the
adversary. This quantity becomes an additional input to the insecurity function.
Pseudorandom functions make good message authentication codes. As we
remarked in the introduction the reduction is standard [10, 11]. We determine the
exact security of this reduction. The following shows that the reduction is almost
tightsecurity hardly degrades at all. This relation means that to prove the security
of the CBC MAC as a MAC it is enough to show that the CBC transform preserves
pseudorandomness.
Proposition 2.7. Let MAC: Keys(MAC)_[0, 1]d  [0, 1]s be a family of
functions, and let q, t1 be integers. Then
AdvmacMAC (q, t)Adv
prf
MAC (q, t$)+
1
2s
, (6)
where t$=t+O(s+d ).
Proof. Let A be any forger attacking the message authentication code MAC.
Assume the oracle in Experiment Forge(MAC, A) is invoked at most q times and
the running-time of A is at most t, these quantities being measured as discussed in
Definition 2.6. We design a distinguisher BA for MAC versus Randd  s such that
AdvprfMAC (BA)Adv
mac
MAC (A)&
1
2s
. (7)
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Moreover, B will run in time t$ and make at most q queries to its oracle, with the
time measured as discussed in Definition 2.1. This implies Eq. (6) because
AdvmacMAC (q, t)=max
A
[AdvmacMAC (A)]
max
A
[AdvprfMAC (BA)+2
&s]
=max
A
[AdvprfMAC (BA)]+2
&s
max
B
[AdvprfMAC (B)]+2
&s
=AdvprfMAC (q, t$)+2
&s.
Above the first equality is by the definition of the insecurity function in Defini-
tion 2.6. The following inequality uses Eq. (7). Next we simplify using properties of
the maximum and conclude by using the definition of the insecurity function as per
Definition 2.1.
So it remains to design BA so that Eq. (7) is true. Remember that BA is given an
oracle for a function f : [0, 1]d  [0, 1]s. It will run A, providing it an environment
in which A’s oracle queries are answered by BA . When A finally outputs its forgery,
BA checks whether it is correct, and if so bets that f must have been an instance
of the family MAC rather than a random function.
By assumption the oracle in Experiment Forge(MAC, A) is invoked at most q
times, and for simplicity we assume it is exactly q. This means that the number of
queries made by A to its oracle is q&1. Here now is the code implementing BA .
Distinguisher B fA
For i=1, ..., q&1 do
When A asks its oracle some query, Mi , answer with f (Mi)
End For
A outputs (M, _)
_$  f (M)
If _=_$ and M  [M1 , ..., Mq&1]
then return 1 else return 0
Here BA initializes A with some random sequence of coins and starts running it.
When A makes its first oracle query M1 , algorithm BA pauses and computes f (M1)
using its own oracle f. The value f (M1) is returned to A and the execution of the
latter continues in this way until all its oracle queries are answered. Now A will
output its forgery (M, _). BA verifies the forgery, and if it is correct, returns 1.
We now proceed to the analysis. We claim that
Pr[ f R MAC : B fA=1]=Adv
mac
MAC (A) (8)
Pr[ f R Randd  s : B fA=1]
1
2s
. (9)
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Subtracting, we get Eq. (7), and from the code it is evident that BA makes q oracle
queries. Taking into account our conventions about the running-times referring to
that of the entire experiment it is also true that the running-time of BA is
t+O(d+s). So it remains to justify the two equations above.
In the first case f is an instance of MAC, so that the simulated environment that
BA is providing for A is exactly that of Experiment Forge(MAC, A). Since BA
returns 1 exactly when A makes a successful forgery, we have Eq. (8).
In the second case, A is running in an environment that is alien to it, namely one
where a random function is being used to compute MACs. We have no idea what
A will do in this environment, but no matter what, we know that the probability
that _= f (M) is 2&s, because f is a random function, as long as A did not query
M of its oracle. Equation (9) follows. K
2.5. The CBC Transform
Let f : [0, 1] l  [0, 1] l be a function and m>0 an integer. We associate to them
another function f (m): [0, 1]ml  [0, 1] l called the CBC MAC of f, as follows. If x
is a string in the domain [0, 1]ml then we view it as a sequence of l-bit blocks and
let xi denote the i th block for i=1, ..., m. We then set
Function f (m)(x1 } } } xm)
y0  0l
For i=1, ..., m do yi  f ( yi&1 xi)
Return ym
The construct extends in a natural way to a family of functions. The CBC transform
associates to a given family F: Keys(F )_[0, 1]l  [0, 1] l and integer m>0 another
family that we denote CBCm-F. It maps Keys(F )_[0, 1]ml  [0, 1] l. As the nota-
tion indicates, the new family has the same key-space and range as F, but a larger
domain. For any key a # Keys(F ) and any input x=x1 } } } xm # [0, 1]ml we set
CBCm-Fa(x1 } } } xm)=F (m)a (x1 } } } xm).
Or, in more detail
Function CBCm-F(a, x1 } } } xm)
y0  0l
For i=1, ..., m do yi  F(a, yi&1 xi)
Return ym
We stress that the domain of CBCm-F consists of strings of length exactly ml, not
at most ml.
3. PSEUDORANDOMNESS OF THE CBC-MAC
In this section we show that the CBC MAC transform applied to a PRF yields
a PRF and assess how the security of the transformed family depends on that of the
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given family. In the next section we derive the implications on the security of the
CBC MAC as a message authentication code.
The practical concern is the case where the family to which the CBC MAC trans-
form is applied is a block cipher. The analysis however begins by considering a
thought-experiment. Namely, we consider the CBC MAC of a random function, or,
more formally, the family resulting from applying the CBC MAC transform to the
family Randl  l of all functions of l-bits to l-bits. By considering this, we are asking
whether the CBC MAC transform has any inherent weaknesses, meaning weak-
nesses that would exist even for ideal block ciphers. Our first result below (the
information-theoretic case of the CBC theorem) says that at least in a qualitative
sense, the answer is no: the transform is provably secure. The theorem goes further,
providing also a quantitative bound on the insecurity. The second result (the com-
putational case of the CBC theorem) considers the case of a given block cipher or
family F and bounds the insecurity of the transformed family in terms of that of the
original one.
Below we first present and discuss both theorems. We then prove the second,
which follows from the first by relatively standard means. We then go on to the
main technical part of the paper, which is the proof of the information theoretic
case of the CBC theorem.
3.1. Main Results
Information theoretic case. The information-theoretic case of the CBC theorem
considers an adversary A of unrestricted computational power who faced with the
following problem. The adversary is given an oracle to a function g chosen in one
of the following ways: either g is a random function of ml bits to l bits, or g= f (m)
for a random function f of l bits to l bits. The choice between these two possibilities
is made according to a hidden coin flip. What is A’s advantage in figuring out
which type of oracle he or she has, as a function of the number q of oracle queries
he or she makes? The formal statement is made in terms of the distance function
of Definition 2.3. The proof of the following is in Section 3.3.
Theorem 3.1 (CBC theorem: Information-theoretic case). Let l, m1 and q0
be integers. Let C=CBCm-Randl  l and let R=Randml  l. Then
AdvdistC, R(q)1.5 }
q2m2
2l
.
In other words an adversary making q queries cannot have an advantage exceeding
3q2m2 } 2&l&1, no matter what strategy this adversary uses.
Numerical example. Suppose l=128 bits and we use the CBC MAC over a ran-
dom function to authenticate q=230 messages of 16 Kbyte each (so m=210 blocks).
Then no adversary, after adaptively obtaining the MACs of q=230 strings, has an
advantage as large as 5.4_10&15 at distinguishing these MACs from purely random
strings. Consequently, no adversary will be able, after having performed the above
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tests, to forge one new MAC with probability as large as 5.4_10&15. (The two
probabilities differ by an additive factor of 2&128, as per Proposition 2.7).)
Computational case. Now suppose F: Keys(F )_[0, 1]l  [0, 1] l is some given
family of functions, for example a block cipher like DES or RC6. Assume the given
family is a PRF (or PRP). We want to know how secure the CBC MAC based on
this family is. The following theorem considers an adversary A given an oracle to
a function g chosen in one of the following ways: either g is a random function of
ml bits to l bits, or g= f (m) for a random instance f of family F. The choice between
these two possibilities is made according to a hidden coin flip. What is A’s advan-
tage in figuring out which type of oracle he or she has, as a function of the number
q of oracle queries made and the amount t of computation time used? The proof
of the following is in Section 3.2.
Theorem 3.2 (CBC theorem: Computational case). Let l, m1 and q, t0 be
integers. Let F: Keys(F )_[0, 1] l  [0, 1] l be a family of functions. Then
AdvprfCBCm-F (q, t)Adv
prf
F (q$, t$)+1.5 }
q2m2
2l
(10)
AdvprpF (q$, t$)+
q2m2
2l&1
, (11)
where q$=mq and t$=t+O(mql ).
The constant hidden in the O-notation, here and elsewhere in this paper, depends
only on details of the model of computation. One should think of t as being large
compared to the other parameters, so that t$rt.
Here is one way to interpret the theorem. Suppose F was Randl  l, the family of
all functions. Then Theorem 3.1 says that AdvprfCBCm-F (q, t) would be at most
1.5 } q2m2 } 2&l. Theorem 3.2 says that when F is not Rand l  l we need to just add
in the ‘‘distance’’ of F to Randl  l, meaning AdvprfF (q$, t$). Viewed in this way,
Theorem 3.2 is quite intuitive.
The reason for the second inequality in Theorem 3.2 is that block ciphers are
more naturally viewed as PRPs and thus it is more useful to phrase the bound in
terms of the insecurity of F as a PRP. (However, in this case there is little numerical
difference in the two because the second term in the first inequality is already
proportional to q2.)
Numerical example. Suppose we use the CBC MAC where the underlying block
cipher is the AES algorithm (a block cipher soon to be selected by the National
Institute of Standards). This block cipher will have a block-length of l=128 bits.
Suppose some scientist finds a practical method which, after obtaining the MACs
of q=230 messages, each message of length 16 Kbyte, distinguishes with an advan-
tage of 10 the 230 answers just obtained and 230 random strings. Then there is
some equally practical methodits running time is essentially that of the first
methodwhich has an advantage of at least 0.017.2_10&15r10 at differentiat-
ing AES values on 240 points from as many random distinct points. This would be
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bad news for the AES and might be seen as highly unlikely for a modern and
conservatively designed block cipher.
3.2. Proof of Theorem 3.2
In the asymptotic setting such a proof would normally proceed by contradiction.
We would assume there was an adversary A that succeeded in breaking CBCm-F,
and then design another adversary BA that succeeds in breaking F while using
resources polynomial in those used by the original adversary. The underlying idea
remains the same, but in the concrete security setting it is less convenient to use
contradiction. We simply associate to any A some BA and then proceed to relate
their success probabilities. The relations must be done carefully and with regard to
tightness of the analysis. The proof below will use Theorem 3.1 in a crucial way.
The main lemma below equates the advantage of A in distinguishing between
CBCm-F and Randml  l with the sum of two other advantages. The first is that
obtained by BA in distinguishing between F and Randl  l, while the second is that
of A in distinguishing between CBCm-Rand l  l and Randml  l.
Lemma 3.3. Let A be a distinguisher for CBCm-F versus Randml  l which makes
at most q oracle queries and has running-time at most t. Then there is a distinguisher
BA for F versus Randl  l such that
AdvprfCBCm-F (A)=Adv
prf
F (BA)+Adv
prf
CBCm-Rand l  l (A),
and, furthermore, BA makes at most q$ oracle queries and has running-time at most
t$, where q$=mq and t$=t+O(mql).
We conclude the proof of Theorem 3.2 given the above lemma and then return
to prove the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let A be a distinguisher for CBCm-F versus Randml  l
which makes at most q oracle queries and has running-time at most t. Then
AdvprfCBCm-Rand l  l (A)Adv
dist
CBCm-Rand l  l, Randml  l (q)
1.5 }
q2m2
2l
.
Here the first inequality is true because A makes at most q queries, and the second
inequality is by Theorem 3.1. Let BA be as given by Lemma 3.3. By that lemma and
the above we have
AdvprfCBCm-F (A)Adv
prf
F (BA)+1.5 }
q2m2
2l
. (12)
Furthermore we know that BA makes at most q$ oracle queries and has running-
time at most t$. Equation (10) follows because
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AdvprfCBCm-F (q, t)=max
A
[AdvprfCBCm-F (A)]
max
A {AdvprfF (BA)+1.5 }
q2m2
2l =
=max
A
[AdvprfF (BA)]+1.5 }
q2m2
2 l
max
B
[AdvprfF (B)]+1.5 }
q2m2
2l
=AdvprfF (q$, t$)+1.5 }
q2m2
2l
.
Above, the first equality is by the definition of the insecurity function. The following
inequality uses Eq. (12). Next we simplify using properties of the maximum and
conclude by again using the definition of the insecurity function.
Equation (11) now follows from Eq. (10) and Proposition 2.5:
AdvprfCBCm-F (q, t)Adv
prf
F (q$, t$)+1.5 }
q2m2
2l
AdvprpF (q$, t$)+1.5 }
q2m2
2l
+0.5 }
q$(q$&1)
2l
AdvprpF (q$, t$)+
q2m2
2l&1
.
The last inequality upper bounds q$&1 by q$ and substitutes q$=qm. K
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Distinguisher BA gets an oracle f : [0, 1] l  [0, 1]l. It will
run A as a subroutine, using f to simulate the oracle g: [0, 1]ml  [0, 1] l that A
expects. That is, BA will itself provide the answers to A’s oracle queries by
appropriately using f.
Distinguisher B fA
For i=1, ..., q do
When A asks its oracle some query, Mi , answer with f (m)(M i)
End For
A outputs a bit, b
Return b
Here BA initializes A with some random sequence of coins and starts running it.
When A makes its first oracle query M1 , algorithm BA pauses and computes
f (m)(M1), which it can do because f (m)( } ) can be computed by making m calls to
f ( } ). The value f (m)(M1) is returned to A and the execution of the latter continues
in this way until all its oracle queries are answered. Now A will output its guess bit
b. Adversary BA simply returns the same as its own guess bit.
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We now proceed to the analysis. The oracle supplied to A by BA in the simula-
tion is f (m) where f is BA ’s oracle, and hence
AdvprfF (BA)=Pr[ f 
R F : B fA=1]&Pr[ f 
R
Randl  l : B fA=1]
=Pr[ g R CBCm-F : A g=1]&Pr[ g R CBCm-Rand l  l : A g=1].
On the other hand
AdvprfCBCm-Rand l  l (A)
=Pr[ g R CBCm-Randl  l : A g=1]&Pr[ g R Randml  l : A g=1].
Take the sum of the two equations above and exploit the cancellation to get
Pr[ g R CBCm-F : A g=1]&Pr[ g R Randml  l : A g=1].
But this is exactly AdvprfCBCm-F (A). K
3.3. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Intuition. Before going into the formal proof, we give some intuition for it, with
the caveat that this theorem seems prone to intuitive arguments that do not hold
up to more rigorous scrutiny.
First, we consider what can go wrong. In computing MACs of the form
f (m)(x1 } } } xm), we compute quantities of the form f (i)(x1 } } } xi) and f (i)(x1 } } } xi)
xi+1 . Even though the results of these subcomputations are hidden from the adver-
sary, certain coincidences, which we call collisions, allow the adversary to dis-
tinguish f (m) from a truly random function. For example, suppose that for unequal
sequences of i blocks, x1 } } } xi and x$1 } } } x$i ,
f (i)(x1 } } } x i)= f (i)(x$1 } } } x$i).
Then f (m)(x1 } } } xi xi+1 } } } xm)= f (m)(x$1 } } } x$i xi+1 } } } xm) for any xi+1 } } } xm , a
clear deviation from randomness. We therefore give up if such collisions ever occur.
Indeed, much of our proof (Lemma 3.8, and the supporting machinery of
Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7) is spent showing that these collisions occur only rarely
regardless of the strategy used by the adversary.
On the positive side, we have the following simple observation: if f (x) has not
been computed before or constrained in any way, then its value is uniformly dis-
tributed over l-bit strings, independent of any previous computations. This is good
in a direct way, because we want the values of the MAC to be random. It is also
good in an indirect way, because such a random value is highly unlikely to cause
a collision. The rough intuition is that we start in a collision-free state, so any new
values generated will be random. Since these values are random, they are unlikely
to form a collision.
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FIG. 1. Querying the value of f (m)(X) for X=(x1 , x2) corresponds to traversing a path from the
root to a leaf in the full tree. This path follows the edge x1 to node x1 , labeled with Y(x1)=x1 and
Z(x1)= f (x1). The path then follows the edge x2 to node (x1 , x2), labeled with Y(x1 , x2)=Z(x1)x2
and Z(x1 , x2)= f (Y(x1 , x2)). The adversary only learns Z(x1 , x2)= f (m)(X).
We represent all possible subcomputations that might be performed as nodes in
a large tree; the subcomputations induced by the adversary form a subtree. The
specific values of f (i)(x1 } } } xi) and f (i)(x1 } } } xi)xi+1 are represented as labels
(Z and Y, respectively) of the nodes in this tree.
Our proof relies on the fact that the adversary has only a partial view of the sub-
computations performed on its behalf; if it were omniscient it could easily generate
a collision. We therefore take a Bayesian viewpoint. Given the adversary’s current
knowledge, the hidden subcomputations have some induced conditional probability
distribution. We show that despite the adversary’s view, the values of these subcom-
putations are sufficiently random that our intuition that random outputs do not
cause collisions is valid.
Setup. We now begin the full proof. Fix an adversary A. Since we are not
restricting computation time a standard argument shows that we may assume
without loss of generality that A is deterministic. We begin with some definitions.
The connection between these definitions and the game we are considering will be
made later.
Query sequences and labelings. Call the 2l-ary rooted tree of depth m the full
tree. A sequence X=x1 } } } xi of l-bit strings (1im) names a node at depth i in
the natural way. The root is denoted 4. A function f : [0, 1]l  [0, 1]l induces
labelings Yf (X) and Zf (X), recursively defined by
Zf (4)=0l,
Yf (x1 } } } xi)=Zf (x1 } } } xi&1)xi and
Zf (X)= f (Yf (X)) for X{4.
Yf (4) is undefined. We drop the subscript when f is clear from context or unimpor-
tant to the discussion. We sometimes refer to Y as the input labeling and Z as the
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output labeling, motivated by the relation Z(X)= f (Y(X)). Note that for X{4,
Z(X)= f (i)(X). We sometimes use labeling to refer to both labelings.
A sequence of distinct nonroot nodes X1 , ..., Xn is a query sequence if for every i
there is a j<i such that the parent of Xi is either Xj or 4. The query tree associated
to a query sequence X1 , ..., Xn is the (rooted) subtree of the full tree induced by the
nodes [4, X1 , ..., Xn]; it consists of a collection of root emanating paths. Nodes at
depth m are called border nodes.
Definition 3.4. A labeling Y of X1 , ..., Xn is collision free if Y(X1), ..., Y(Xn) are
distinct; collision-freeness for Z is defined analogously.
Definition 3.5. A border labeling Z of a query sequence is a map assigning an
l-bit string to each border node in the query tree. A labeling Z is consistent with
a border labeling Z if the two agree on the border nodes.
A new view of the game. A query x1 } } } xm of the adversary to the g-oracle can
be thought of as specifying a root to the border path in the full tree. Now imagine
a slightly different game in which the adversary has more power and can sequen-
tially make qm queries, each a node in the full tree, with the restriction that his or
her queries form a query sequence X1 , ..., Xqm . The adversary receives no answer to
queries which are internal nodes of the full tree, but when he or she queries a
border node, he or she receives its Zf value. It suffices to prove the theorem for
adversaries with this enlarged set of capabilities.
The basic random variables. The query sequence, its Zf -labeling, and the values
returned to the adversary are all random variables over the random choice of
f # Randl  l. We denote by X1 , ..., Xqm the random variables which are the queries
of A. We denote by Zn the labeling of X1 , ..., Xn specified by Zf . We denote by Z n
the labeling of the border nodes of the query tree associated to X1 , ..., Xn specified
by Zf . The input labeling induced by Zn is denoted Yn . The view of A after, her nth
query is the random variable Viewn=(X1 , ..., Xn ; Z n).
Equi-probability of collision-free labelings. The following lemma fixes the
number n of queries that A has made. It then fixes a particular view (X1 , ..., Xn ; Z )
of A. It now examines the distribution on labelings from the point of view of A. It
says that as far as A can tell, all collision free labelings of X1 , ..., Xn consistent with
the adversary’s current view are equally likely.
Lemma 3.6. Let 1nqm and let X1 , ..., Xn be a query sequence. Let Z1n and Z
2
n
be collision free (output) labelings of X1 , ..., Xn which are consistent with a border
labeling Z n of X1 , ..., Xn . Then
Pr[Zn=Z1n | Viewn=(X1 , ..., Xn ; Z n)]=Pr[Zn=Z
2
n | Viewn=(X1 , ..., Xn ; Z n)],
where the probability is taken over the choice of f.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. The proof is by induction on n. The lemma holds
vacuously for n=1. Assuming the lemma for 1, ..., n&1 we now prove it for n. Let
Zin&1 be the restriction of Z
i
n to X1 , ..., Xn&1 (i=1, 2). Let Z n&1 be the restriction
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of Z n to the border nodes of X1 , ..., Xn&1 . Let Vi be the event View i=
(X1 , ..., Xi ; Z i) and let Prj[ } ]=Pr[ } | V j], for j=n&1, n. Let Y ij denote the input
labeling induced by Z ij for j=n&1, n and i=1, 2. We consider two cases.
Case 1. Xn is not a border node.
For i=1, 2 we have:
Prn[Zn=Z in]=Prn&1[Zn=Z
i
n]
=Prn&1[Zn&1=Z in&1] } Prn&1[Zn(Xn)=Z
i
n(Xn) | Zn&1=Z
i
n&1]
=Prn&1[Zn&1=Z in&1] } 2
&l.
The proof is concluded by using the inductive hypothesis. We now justify the above
three equalities. Since Xn is not a border node, it is determined by X1 , ..., Xn&1 ;
Z n&1 . This means that Prn[ } ] equals Prn&1[ } ] which justifies the first equality.
The second is just conditioning. Since Zin is collision free, Y
i
n differs from all the
points Y in&1(X1), ..., Y
i
n&1(Xn&1) on which the underlying randomly chosen f has
been evaluated so far. But Zn(Xn)= f (Y in(Xn)), so the second term in the product
in the second line above is indeed 2&l, implying the third equality. Note that the
above probabilities are not conditioned one Zn being collision free.
Case 2. Xn is a border node.
Both Z1n and Z
2
n are by assumption consistent with Z n . But since Xn is a border
node, the value ‘ =def Zn(Xn) is contained in Z n , and ‘ =Z1n(Xn)=Z
2
n(Xn). Now for
i=1, 2 we have:
Prn[Zn&1=Z in&1]=Prn&1[Zn&1=Z
i
n&1 | Zn(Xn)=‘ ]
=Prn&1[Zn(Xn)=‘ | Zn&1=Z in&1] }
Prn&1[Zn&1=Z in&1]
Prn&1[Zn(Xn)=‘ ]
=2&l }
Prn&1[Zn&1=Z in&1]
Prn&1[Zn(Xn)=‘ ]
.
The events Vn and Vn&1 7 (Zn(Xn)=‘ ) are the same, since Zn(Xn)=‘ ‘‘fills’’ in the
portion of Viewn not contained in Viewn&1 ; the first equality follows. The second
equality follows from Bayes’ rule. That the first term of the product in the second
line above is indeed 2&l is argued as in Case 1 based on the fact that Z in is collision
free. Now note the denominator in the fraction above is independent of i # [1, 2].
Applying the inductive hypothesis, we conclude that
Prn[Zn&1=Z1n&1]=Prn[Zn&1=Z
2
n&1]. (13)
Now for i=1, 2:
Prn[Zn=Z in]=Prn[Zn&1=Z
i
n&1] } Prn[Zn(Xn)=‘ | Zn&1=Z
i
n&1]
=Prn[Zn&1=Z in&1] } 1.
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The second term in the above product is 1 because Vn contains ‘ as the value of
Zn(Xn). The proof for this case is concluded by applying Eq. (13). K
More definitions. Let X1 , ..., Xn be a query sequence. We will discuss labelings
z which assign values only to some specified subset S of this sequence. The input
labeling induced by z assigns values to all nodes of X1 , ..., Xn which are at level one
and all nodes whose parents are in S. We can discuss collision freeness of such
labelings, or their consistency with a border labeling, in the usual way. We denote
by ZSn the labeling of S given by restricting Zn to S. Let ColFree(Z) be true if
labeling Z is collision free.
Unpredictability of internal labels. The following lemma fixes the number n of
queries that A has made, as well as a particular view X1 , ..., Xn ; Z of A. It now
makes the assumption that the current labeling Zn is collision free; think of this fact
as being known to A. Given all this, it examines the distribution on labels from the
point of view of A. Some labels are known: for example, the Zn values of border
nodes and the Yn values of nodes at depth one. The lemma says that all other labels
are essentially unpredictable. First, it considers a node x1 } } } xixi+1 that is at depth
at least two and says, that even given the output labels (i.e., Zn values) of all nodes
except its parent x1 } } } x i , the Yn value of x1 } } } xixi+1 is almost uniformly dis-
tributed. Second, it considers a node x1 } } } x i that is not a border node and says
that even given the output labels of all other nodes, the Zn value of x1 } } } xi is
almost uniformly distributed. For technical reasons the lemma requires a bound on
the number n of queries that have been made.
Lemma 3.7. Let 1nqm&1 and suppose n24+n&12l2. Let X1 , ..., Xn be
a query sequence and let Z be a labeling of the border nodes of X1 , ..., Xn . Let
Prn[ } ]=Pr[ } | Viewn=(X1 , ..., Xn ; Z ) 7 ColFree(Zn)],
where the probability is taken over the choice of f. Suppose x1 } } } xi # [X1 , ..., Xn] is
a nonborder node and let S=[X1 , ..., Xn]&[x1 } } } xi]. Suppose z : S  [0, 1] l is a
collision free labeling of S that is consistent with Z .
(1) Let x1 } } } xixi+1 # S be a child of x1 } } } xi . Then for any y* # [0, 1] l:
Prn[Yn(x1 } } } x ixi+1)= y* | ZSn =z ]2 } 2
&l.
(2) For any z* # [0, 1]l:
Prn[Zn(x1 } } } x i)=z* | ZSn =z ]2 } 2
&l.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Let x1 } } } x ixui+1 (u=1, ..., s) be the children of x1 } } } xi .
Denote by children(x1 } } } x i) the set [x1 } } } xi x1i+1 , ..., x1 } } } xix
s
i+1]. Let
y : [X1 , ..., Xn]&children(x1 } } } xi)  [0, 1] l be the input labeling induced by z .
We prove the two claims in turn.
Proof of (1). Let us begin by giving some intuition for the proof. We observe
that with z given, if we assign an input label y # [0, 1]l to x1 } } } xixi+1 then the
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value of Zn at the parent node x1 } } } xi is determined; given this, the values of Yn
at the other children of x1 } } } xi are also determined. Thus, both Zn and Yn are now
fully determined for all nodes X1 , ..., Xn . We will show that there is a large set S(z )
of these y values for which the determined labeling is collision free. Moreover, all
collision free labelings have this form and are equally likely by Lemma 3.6; thus as
far as A can tell, the value at x1 } } } x ix i+1 is equally likely to be anything from the
set S(z ). The formal proof follows.
Assume without loss of generality that x1 } } } xix1i+1=x1 } } } xix i+1 . Let
y # [0, 1]l be some fixed string. Now define the labeling Zz , y : [X1 , ..., Xn]  [0, 1]l
by:
Zz , y(X j)={z (Xj)yx1i+1
if Xj {x1 } } } xi
otherwise.
Let Yz , y denote the input labeling induced by Zz , y , and observe that it is given by
Yz , y(X j)={y (Xj)yx1i+1 xui+1
if Xj  children(x1 } } } xi)
if Xj=x1 } } } x ixui+1 for some 1us.
Let S(z ) be the set of all strings y such that Zz , y is a collision-free labeling. We
leave to the reader to check that y  S(z ) if and only if one of the following two
conditions is satisfied:
(1) Either yx1i+1 # [z (Xj): 1 jn and Xj {x1 } } } xi]; or
(2) For some u # [1, ..., s] it is the case that yx1i+1 x
u
i+1 # [ y (Xj): 1 jn
and Xj  children(x1 } } } x i)].
This implies that |[0, 1]l&S(z )|(n&1)+(n&s) sn&1+n242l2. So
|S(z )|2l&2l22l2. Now observe that any collision-free labeling equals Zz , y for
some z , y as above. Furthermore by Lemma 3.6 all collision-free labelings are
equally likely. From this one can prove the desired statement.
Proof of (2). The idea is very similar to the above. This time, observe that with
z given, if we assign an output label z # [0, 1]l to x1 } } } xi then the values of both
Zn and Yn are fully determined for all nodes X1 , ..., Xn . We show as before that
there is a set S(z ) of these z values for which the determined labeling is collision-free
and conclude as before using the equiprobability of collision-free labelings. The
formal proof follows.
Let z # [0, 1] l be some fixed string. Now define the labeling Zz , z : [X1 , ..., Xn] 
[0, 1]l by:
Zz , z(Xj)={z (Xj)z
if X j {x1 } } } x i
otherwise.
Let Yz , z denote the input labeling induced by Zz , z , and observe that it is given by
Yz , z(Xj)={y (Xj)zxui+1
if Xj  children(x1 } } } x i)
if Xj=x1 } } } xixui+1 for some 1us.
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Let S(z ) be the set of all strings z such that Zz , z is a collision-free labeling. We leave
to the reader to check that z  S(z ) if and only if one of the following two
conditions is satisfied:
(1) Either z # [z (Xj): 1 jn and Xj {x1 } } } xi]; or
(2) For some u # [1, ..., s] it is the case that zxui+1 # [ y (Xj): 1 jn and
Xj  children(x1 } } } x i)].
This implies that |[0, 1] l&S(z )|  (n&1)+(n&s) s  n&1+n242l2. So
|S(z )|2l2. Now observe that any collision-free labeling equals Zz , z for some z , z
as above. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.6 all collision-free labelings are equally likely.
From this one can prove the desired statement. K
Bounding the probability of collisions. The following lemma fixes the number n
of queries that A has made, as well as a particular view X1 , ..., Xn ; Z of A. It now
makes the assumption that the current labeling Zn is collision-free; think of this fact
as being known to A. Given all this, it considers A’s adding a new node Xn+1 to
the tree. It says that the labeling is likely to retain its collision-freeness; that is, Zn+1
is collision-free with high probability. The same technical condition on n as in the
previous lemma is required.
Note that Xn+1 is determined by X1 , ..., Xn ; Z . The value Zn+1(Xn+1) has not yet
been returned to A, and it makes sense to discuss the distribution of this value
given X1 , ..., Xn ; Z .
Lemma 3.8. Let 1nqm&1 and suppose n24+n&12l2. Let X1 , ..., Xn be
a query sequence and let Z be a labeling of the border nodes of X1 , ..., Xn . Then
Pr[cColFree(Zn+1) | Viewn=(X1 , ..., Xn ; Z ) 7 ColFree(Zn)]3n } 2&l,
where the probability is taken over the choice of f.
Proof. We use the following notation:
Prn[ } ]=Pr[ } | Viewn=(X1 , ..., Xn ; Z ) 7 ColFree(Zn)].
Case 1. Xn+1 is at level one.
Let Xn+1=x 1 . Note its input label is by definition x 1 . For each t=1, ..., n we
claim that
Prn[Yn(Xt)=x 1]2 } 2&l. (14)
To see why this is true, consider two cases. First, if Xt is at level one then
Prn[Yn(Xt)=x 1]=0 by definition. On the other hand suppose Xt is at depth at
least two. Then Xt=x1 } } } x ix i+1 is the child of some x1 } } } x i # [X1 , ..., Xn].
Equation (14) now follows by Part 1 of Lemma 3.7.
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If x 1  [Yn(X1), ..., Yn(Xn)], then even conditioned on Viewn , Zn+1(Xn+1) will be
uniformly distributed over l-bit strings. Given this observation and Eq. (14) we can
bound the probability of a collision as follows:
Prn[cColFree(Zn+1)]Prn[x 1 # [Yn(X1), ..., Yn(Xn)]]+Prn[Zn+1(Xn+1)
# [Zn(X1), ..., Zn(Xn)] | x 1  [Yn(X1), ..., Yn(Xn)]]

2n
2l
+
n
2l

3n
2l
.
Case 2. Xn+1 is not at level one.
Then Xn+1=x1 } } } xix i+1 is the child of some x1 } } } xi # [X1 , ..., Xn]. Let
S=[X1 , ..., Xn]&[x1 } } } xi]. We first claim that for any Xt # [X1 , ..., Xn]:
Prn[Yn+1(Xn+1)=Yn(Xt)]2 } 2&l. (15)
To see why this is true, consider two cases. First, if Xt is a sibling of Xn+1 then
Prn[Yn+1(Xn+1)=Yn(Xt)]=0
by definition. On the other hand suppose Xt is not a sibling of Xn+1 . Then a colli-
sion-free labeling z of S determines Yn(Xt). Using this and Part 2 of Lemma 3.7 we
have the following (the sum here is over all collision-free labelings z of S which are
consistent with Z ):
Prn[Yn+1(Xn+1)=Yn(Xt)]
=:
z
Prn[Yn+1(Xn+1)=Yn(Xt) | ZSn =z ] } Prn[Z
S
n =z ]
=:
z
Prn[Zn(x1 } } } x i)=Yn(Xt)x i+1 | ZSn =z ] } Prn[ZSn =z ]

2
2l
} :
z
Prn[Z
S
n =z ]
2
2 l
.
Thus Eq. (15) is again established.
Given Eq. (15) we can bound the probability of a collision:
Prn[cColFree(Zn+1)]Prn[Yn+1(Xn+1) # [Yn(X1), ..., Yn(Xn)]]
+Prn[Zn+1(Xn+1) # [Zn(X1), ..., Zn(Xn)]
| Yn+1(Xn+1)  [Yn(X1), ..., Yn(Xn)]]

2n
2l
+
n
2l

3n
2l
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.8. K
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Concluding the proof. We need to show that
AdvdistCBCm-Rand l  l, Randml  l (A)1.5 }
q2m2
2l
.
Let Pr1[ } ] denote the probability when A’s oracle g is chosen via f 
R
Randl  l;
g  f (m), and let CF=ColFree(Zqm&1). Let Pr2[ } ] denote the probability when A’s
oracle g is chosen via g R Randml  l. We claim that
Pr1[A g=1 | cCF]=Pr2[A g=1]. (16)
This is true because as long as the current labeling Zn which A has is collision-free,
the value of a border node returned to A by g= f (m) is a random l-bit string dis-
tributed independent of anything else. Thus the distribution on A’s view is the same
as if A were replied to by a random function g from Randml  l. Now using Eq. (16)
we have
AdvdistCBC m-Rand l  l, Randml  l (A)
=Pr1[A g=1]&Pr2[A g=1]
=Pr1[A g=1 | CF] } Pr1[CF]+Pr1[A g=1 | cCF] } Pr1[cCF]&Pr2[A g=1]
=Pr1[A g=1 | CF] } Pr1[CF]+Pr2[A g=1] } Pr1[cCF]&Pr2[A g=1]
Pr1[CF]+Pr2[A g=1] } (Pr1[cCF]&1)
Pr1[CF]
 :
qm&2
n=1
Pr1[cColFree(Zn+1) | ColFree(Zn)]
3(qm&2)(qm&1) } 2&l&1.
The last inequality follows from Lemma 3.8, which can be applied since
qm2(l+1)2 implies n24+n&12l2 for all n=1, ..., qm&2. This concludes the
proof.
4. SECURITY OF CBC AS A MAC
The previous section showed that the CBC MAC of a PRF is itself a PRF. Recall
our original goal was to assess the security of the CBC MAC as a MAC. In other
words, we want to assess the resistance to forgery rather than the indistinguish-
ability with respect to random functions. This is easily done given what we now
know. Below we begin by stating the corresponding theorem.
4.1. Upper Bounding the MAC Insecurity of CBC
The following theorem bounds the MAC insecurity of CBCm-F (as defined in
Section 2.4) in terms of the insecurity of F as a PRF or PRP, thereby saying that
if F is a PRF or PRP then its CBC MAC is a secure MAC.
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Theorem 4.1 (CBC theorem: Security as a MAC). Let l, m1 and q, t1 be
integers such that qm2(l+1)2. Let F: Keys(F )_[0, 1] l  [0, 1] l be a family of
functions. Then
AdvmacCBC m-F (q, t)Adv
prf
F (q$, t$)+
3q2m2+2
2 l+1
AdvprpF (q$, t$)+
2q2m2+1
2l
,
where q$=mq and t$=t+O(mql ).
Once again the O-notation conceals a small model-dependent constant.
Proof. Applying first Proposition 2.7 and then Theorem 3.2 we get
AdvmacCBCm-F (q, t)Adv
prf
CBCm-F (q, t+O(ml))+
1
2l
AdvprfF (q$, t$)+1.5 }
q2m2
2l
+
1
2l
. (17)
Simplifying the right-hand side yields the first inequality of the theorem. Now we
continue, noting that
AdvmacCBC m-F (q, t)Adv
prf
F (q$, t$)+
3q2m2+2
2l+1
AdvprpF (q$, t$)+
3q2m2+2
2 l+1
+
q$(q$&1)
2l+1
AdvprpF (q$, t$)+
3q2m2+2
2 l+1
+
q2m2
2l+1
.
Simplifying the right-hand side yields the second inequality of the theorem. K
Numerical example (continued ). Suppose we use the CBC MAC where the
underlying block cipher is the AES algorithm (so l=128). Suppose some scientist
finds a practical method which has a 10 chance of forging messages after having
asked for the MACs of q=230 messages, each 16 Kbyte long. Then there is some
equally practical methodits running time is essentially that of the forging algo-
rithmwhich has an advantage of at least 0.017.2_10&15r10 at differentiating
AES values on 240 points from as many random distinct points.
Discussion. Our approach to proving the security of the CBC MAC as a MAC
has been to prove something stronger, namely that it is a PRF. This works because
any PRF is a MAC (Proposition 2.7). However, the converse is not true: not every
MAC is a PRF. Indeed, indistinguishability from a random function is a much
stronger property than unforgeability. This raises the question of whether better
results on the unforgeability of the CBC MAC could be obtained by directly trying
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to analyze it as a MAC. In other words, perhaps bounds on AdvmacCBCm-F (q, t) much
better than those of Theorem 4.1 could be obtained via an analytical approach
different from the one we have taken.
There is room for improvement via alternative approaches. In the next subsection
we show that the quadratic dependence on the number of queries q in the insecurity
function of the CBC MAC is necessary. Thus at best one might hope to reduce the
dependency on the number m of blocks in the messages.
4.2. Birthday Attack on the CBC MAC
The basic idea behind the attack, due to Preneel and Van Oorschott [19] and
(independently) to Krawczyk, is that internal collisions can be exploited for forgery.
Here we use this idea to present an attack on the CBC MAC in the case that the
underlying family is a family of permutations. (We focus on this case because in
practice the CBC MAC is usually based on a block cipher.)
The attacks presented in [19] are analyzed assuming the underlying functions
are random, meaning the family to which the CBC MAC transform is applied is
Randl  l or Perm l. Here we do not make such an assumption. The attack we
present works for any family of permutations. The randomness in our attack (which
is the source of birthday collisions) comes from coin tosses of the forger only. This
makes the attack more general.
Proposition 4.2. Let l, m, q be integers such that 1q2(l+1)2 and m2. Let
F: Keys(F )_[0, 1] l  [0, 1] l be a family of permutations. Then there is a forger A
making q+1 oracle queries, running for time O(lmq log q) and achieving
AdvmacCBC m-F (A)0.316 }
q(q&1)
2l
.
As a consequence for q2
AdvmacCBCm-F (q, t)0.316 }
(q&1)(q&2)
2l
.
The time assessment here puts the cost of an oracle call at one unit.
Comparing the above to Theorem 4.1 we see that our upper bound is tight to
within a factor of the square of the number of message blocks.
We now proceed to the proof. We begin with a couple of lemmas. The first
lemma considers a slight variant of the usual birthday problem and shows that the
collision probability is still the same as that of the usual birthday problem.
Lemma 4.3. Let l, q be integers such that 1q2(l+1)2. Fix b1 , ..., bq # [0, 1] l.
Then
Pr[r1 , ..., rq 
R [0, 1] l : _i, j such that i{ j and bi r i=bj r j]0.316 }
q(q&1)
2l
.
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Proof. This is just like throwing q balls into N=2l bins and lower bounding the
collision probability, except that things are shifted a bit: the bin assigned to the ith
ball is ri bi rather than ri as we would usually imagine. But with bi fixed, if ri is
uniformly distributed, so is ri bi . So the probabilities are the same as in the
standard birthday problem of Appendix A. K
The first part of the following lemma states an obvious property of the CBC
MAC transform. The item of real interest is the second part of the lemma, which
says that in the case where the underlying function is a permutation, the CBC MAC
transform has the property that output collisions occur if and only if input
collisions occur. This is crucial to the attack we will present later.
Lemma 4.4. Let l, m2 be integers and f : [0, 1]l  [0, 1] l a function. Suppose
:1 } } } :m and ;1 } } } ;m in [0, 1]ml are such that :k=;k for k=3, ..., m. Then
f (:1):2= f (;1);2 O f (m)(:1 } } } :m)= f (m)(;1 } } } ;m).
If f is a permutation then, in addition, the converse is true:
f (m)(:1 } } } :m)= f (m)(;1 } } } ;m) O f (:1):2= f (;1);2 .
Proof. The first part follows from the definition of f (m). For the second part let
f &1 denote the inverse of the permutation f. The CBC MAC computation is easily
unraveled using f &1. Thus the procedure
ym  f (m)(:1 } } } :m); For k=m downto 3 do yk&1  f &1( yk):k End For;
Return f &1( y2)
returns f (:1):2 , while the procedure
ym  f (m)(;1 } } } ;m); For k=m downto 3 do yk&1  f &1( yk);k End For;
Return f &1( y2)
returns f (;1);2 . But the procedures have the same value of ym by assumption
and we know that :k=;k for k=3, ..., m, so the procedures return the same
thing. K
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Before presenting the forger let us discuss the idea.
The forger A has an oracle g= f (m) where f is an instance of F. The strategy of
the forger is to make q queries all of which agree in the last m&2 blocks. The first
blocks of these queries are all distinct but fixed. The second blocks, however,
are random and independent across the queries. Denoting the first block of query
n by an and the second block as rn , the forger hopes to have i{ j such that
f (ai)ri= f (aj)r j . The probability of this happening is lower bounded by
Lemma 4.3, but simply knowing the event happens with some probability is not
enough; the forger needs to detect its happening. Lemma 4.4 enables us to say that
this internal collision happens iff the output MAC values for these queries are
equal. (This is true because f is a permutation.) We then observe that if the second
blocks of the two colliding queries are modified by the xor to both of some value
a, the resulting queries still collide. The forger can thus forge by modifying the
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second blocks in this way, obtaining the MAC of one of the modified queries using
the second and outputting it as the MAC of the second modified query.
The forger is presented in detail below. It makes use of a subroutine FindCol
that, given a sequence _1 , ..., _q of values, returns a pair (i, j) such that _i=_j if
such a pair exists, and otherwise returns (0, 0).
Forger A g
Let a1 , ..., aq be distinct l-bit strings
For i=1, ..., q do ri 
R [0, 1] l
For i=1, ..., q do
xi, 1  ai ; x i, 2  ri
For k=3, ..., m do xi, k  0l
Xi  xi, 1 } } } xi, m
_i  g(Xi)
End For
(i, j)  FindCol(_1 , ..., _q)
If (i, j)=(0, 0) then abort
Else
Let a be any l-bit string different from 0l
x$i, 2  xi, 2 a; x$j, 2  xj, 2 a
X$i  xi, 1 x$i, 2xi, 3 } } } xi, m ; X$j  xj, 1x$j, 2 xj, 3 } } } xj, m
_$i  g(X$i)
Return (X$j , _$i)
End If
To estimate the probability of success, suppose g= f (m) where f is an instance of F.
Let (i, j) be the pair of values returned by the FindCol subroutine. Assume
(i, j){(0, 0). Then we know that
f (m)(xi, 1 } } } xi, m)= f (m)(xj, 1 } } } x j, m).
By assumption f is a permutation and by design xi, k=xj, k for k=3, ..., m. The
second part of Lemma 4.4 then implies that f (ai)ri= f (aj)rj . Adding a to both
sides we get f (ai) (ri a)= f (aj) (rj a). In other words, f (a i)x$i, 2= f (aj)
x$j, 2 . The first part of Lemma 4.4 then implies that f (m)(X$i)= f (m)(X$j). Thus _$i is a
correct MAC of X$j . Furthermore we claim that X$j is new, meaning it was not
queried of the g oracle. Since a1 , ..., aq are distinct, the only thing we have to worry
about is that X$j=Xj , but this is ruled out because a{0l.
We have just argued that if the FindCol subroutine returns (i, j){(0, 0) then the
forger is successful, so the success probability is the probability that (i, j){(0, 0).
This happens whenever there is a collision amongst the q values _1 , ..., _q .
Lemma 4.4 tells us, however, that there is a collision in these values if and only if
there is a collision amongst the q values f (a1)r1 , ..., f (aq)rq . The probability
is over the random choices of r1 , ..., rq . By Lemma 4.3 the probability of the latter
is lower bounded by the quantity claimed in the Proposition. We conclude the
theorem by noting that, with a simple implementation of FindCol (say using a
balanced binary search tree scheme), a the running-time is as claimed. K
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5. LENGTH VARIABILITY
For simplicity, let us assume throughout this section that strings to be authen-
ticated have length which is a multiple of l bits. This restriction is easy to dispense
with by using simple and well-known padding methods: for example, always
append a ‘‘1’’ and then append the minimal number of 0’s to make the string a
multiple of l bits.
The CBC MAC does not handle variable-length inputs. The CBC MAC does not
directly give a method to authenticate messages of variable input lengths. In fact,
it is easy to break the CBC MAC construction if the length of strings is allowed to
vary (this fact is well known). As an example, if an adversary requests f (1)a of b,
obtaining tb , and then requests f (1)a (tb), obtaining ttb , it can then compute the MAC
f (2)a (b & 0)=ttb for b & 0a string for which it has not asked the MAC.
Appending the length does not work. One possible attempt to authenticate
messages of varying lengths is to append to each string x=x1 } } } xm the number m,
properly encoded as the final l-bit block, and then to CBC MAC the resulting
string m+1 blocks. (Of course this imposes a restriction that m<2l, not likely to
be a serious concern.) We define f a*(x1 } } } xm)= f (m+1)a (x1 } } } xm m).
We show that f * is not a secure MAC. Take arbitrary l-bit words b, b$, and c,
where b{b$. It is easy to check that given
(1) tb= f *(b),
(2) tb$= f *(b$), and
(3) tb1c= f *(b &1& c)
the adversary has in hand f *(b$ &1& tb  tb$ c)the authentication tag of a
string he or she has not asked about beforesince this is precisely tb1c .
Better methods. Despite the failure of the above method there are many suitable
ways to obtain a PRF that is good on variable input lengths. We mention three.
In each, let F be a finite function family from and to l-bit strings. Let x=x1 } } } xm
be the message to which we will apply fa :
(1) Input-length key separation. Set f a*(x)= f (m)am (x), where am= fa(m).
(2) Length-prepending. Set f a*(x)= f (m+1)a (m & x).
(3) Encrypt last block. Set f *a1a2(x)= fa2( f
(m)
a1 (x)).
The last method appears in an informational Annex of [13] and has now been
analyzed by Petrank and Rackoff [18]. It is the most attractive method of the
bunch, since the length of x is not needed until the end of the computation, facilitat-
ing on-line MAC computation. One additional method was mentioned in the
proceedings version of this paper (the ‘‘two-step MAC,’’ [4, p. 352]), but Petrank
and Rackoff have pointed out that this method does not work [18].
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APPENDIX: BIRTHDAY BOUNDS
Many of our estimates require precise bounds on the birthday probabilities which
for completeness we derive here.
The setting is that we have q balls. View them as numbered, 1, ..., q. We also have
N bins, where Nq. We throw the balls at random into the bins, one by one,
beginning with ball 1. At random means that each ball is equally likely to land in
any of the N bins, and the probabilities for all the balls are independent. A collision
is said to occur if some bin ends up containing at least two balls. We are interested
in C(N, q), the probability of a collision.
The birthday phenomenon takes its name from the case when N=365, whence
we are asking what is the chance that, in a group of q people, there are two people
with the same birthday, assuming birthdays are randomly and independently dis-
tributed over the 365 days of the year. It turns out that when q hits - 365r19.1
the chance of a collision is already quite high; for example, at q=20 the chance of
a collision is at least 0.328. The following gives upper and lower bounds on this
probability.
Proposition A.1. Let C(N, q) denote the probability of at least one collision
when we throw q1 balls at random into Nq buckets. Then
C(N, q)
q(q&1)
2N
.
Also
C(N, q)1&e&q(q&1)2N,
and for 1q- 2N
C(N, q)0.316 }
q(q&1)
N
.
Proof of Proposition A.1. Let Ci be the event that the ith ball collides with one
of the previous ones. Then Pr[Ci] is at most (i&1)N, since when the ith ball is
thrown in, there are at most i&1 different occupied bins and the ith ball is equally
likely to land in any of them. Now
C(N, q)=Pr[C1 6 C2 6 } } } 6 Cq]
Pr[C1]+Pr[C2]+ } } } +Pr[Cq]

0
N
+
1
N
+ } } } +
q&1
N
=
q(q&1)
2N
.
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This proves the upper bound. For the lower bound we let Di be the event that there
is no collision after having thrown in the ith ball. If there is no collision after throw-
ing in i balls then they must all be occupying different slots, so the probability of
no collision upon throwing in the (i+1)st ball is exactly (N&i)N. That is,
Pr[Di+1 | Di]=
N&i
N
=1&
i
N
.
Also note Pr[D1]=1. The probability of no collision at the end of the game can
now be computed via
1&C(N, q)=Pr[Dq]
=Pr[Dq | Dq&1] } Pr[Dq&1]
b b
= ‘
q&1
i=1
Pr[D i+1 | Di]
= ‘
q&1
i=1 \1&
i
N+ .
Note that iN1. So we can use the inequality 1&xe&x for each term of the
above expression. This means the above is not more than
‘
q&1
i=1
e&iN=e&1N&2N& } } } &(q&1)N=e&q(q&1)2N.
Putting all this together we get
C(N, q)1&e&q(q&1)2N,
which is the second inequality in Proposition A.1. Finally, to get the last inequality
in the theorem statement, we know q(q&1)2N1 because q- 2N, so we can
use the inequality 1&e&x(1&e&1) x to get
C(N, q)\1&1e+ }
q(q&1)
2N
.
Noting that (1&1e)2>0.316 completes the proof. K
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